Knowing whether a proposition is true means knowing that it is true or knowing that it is false. In this paper, we study logics with a modal operator Kw for knowing whether but without a modal operator K for knowing that. This logic is not a normal modal logic, because we do not have Kw(ϕ → ψ) → (Kwϕ → Kwψ). Knowing whether logic cannot define many common frame properties, and its expressive power is less than that of basic modal logic over classes of models without reflexivity. These features make axiomatizing knowing whether logics non-trivial. We axiomatize knowing whether logic over various frame classes. We also present an extension of knowing whether logic with public announcement operators and we give corresponding reduction axioms for that. We compare our work in detail to two recent similar proposals.
Introduction
The work entitled 'Logics of public communication' by Plaza [Pla89] 1 is mainly known as one of the founding publications, if not the founding publication, of public announcement logic. However, it also treats two other topics worthy of investigation, namely 'knowing value' modal operators and their binary variant 'knowing whether' modal operators. You know the pincode of your bankcard if you know the value of it. You know whether p if you know that p is true or you know that p is false. Plaza demonstrates the use of these operators in his discussion of Sum-and-Product puzzle, and poses as an open question what the axiomatization would be of public announcement logic with these operators [Pla89, p.13] . In [WF13] , the authors investigate knowing value operators in depth and give a complete axiomatization of the logic with knowing value and public announcement, where the knowing value modality behaves quite differently from a modality in a normal modal logic, such as the standard knowledge modality. Unlike the knowing value modality, knowing whether is definable in terms of knowing that. But it still seems interesting to investigate a logic with a knowing whether operator but without the usual knowledge operator, and this motivates this paper.
Knowing whether operators have been discussed in other settings in the logical literature. [HHS96] uses 'knowing whether' operator to establish a continuum of knowledge states in a very neat fashion, which demonstrates that 'knowing whether' is more convenient to use than 'knowing that' in certain contexts, as argued also in [HS93] . In natural language 'knowing whether' is frequently used instead of 'knowing that'. You say: "I know whether it is raining outside," but you do not say: "I know that it is raining outside or I know that it is not raining outside." We often only need to know whether (ϕ ↔ ψ) as the abbreviations of, respectively, ¬⊤, ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ), (¬ϕ∨ψ), and ((ϕ → ψ)∧(ψ → ϕ)). We omit parentheses from formulas unless confusion results. In particular, we assume that ∧ and ∨ bind stronger than → and ↔. For ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ m we write m j=1 ϕ j , and for ϕ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕ m we write m j=1 ϕ j .
Definition 2 (Model).
A model is a triple M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V where S is a non-empty set of possible worlds, → i is a binary relation over S for each i ∈ I, and V is a valuation function assigning a set of worlds V (p) ⊆ S to each p ∈ P. Given a world s ∈ S, a pair (M, s) is a pointed model. A frame is a pair F = S, {→ i | i ∈ I} , i.e., a model without a valuation. We will refer to special classes of models or frames using the notation below. A binary relation is partial-functional iff it corresponds to a partial function, i.e., every world has at most one successor. We will omit parenthesis around pointed models (M, s) whenever convenient. The non-standard notion of partial functionality plays a special role in knowing whether logics.
Notation Frame Property

Definition 3 (Semantics). Given a model M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V , the semantics of PLKwK is defined as follows:
M, s ⊤ ⇔ always M, s p ⇔ s ∈ V (p) M, s ¬ϕ ⇔ M, s ϕ M, s ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, s ϕ and M, s ψ M, s Kw i ϕ ⇔ for all t 1 , t 2 such that s → i t 1 , s → i t 2 :
(M, t 1 ϕ ⇔ M, t 2 ϕ) M, s K i ϕ ⇔ for all t such that s → i t : M, t ϕ If M, s ϕ we say that ϕ is true in (M, s), and sometimes write s ϕ if M is clear; if for all s in M we have M, s ϕ we say that ϕ is valid on M and write M ϕ; if for all M based on F with M ϕ we say that ϕ is valid on F and write F ϕ; if for all F with F ϕ, ϕ is valid and we write ϕ. Given Φ ⊆ PLKwK, M, s |= Φ stands for 'for all ϕ ∈ Φ, M, s |= ϕ,' and similarly for model/frame validity, and validity. If there exists an (M, s) such that M, s ϕ, then ϕ is satisfiable.
Intuitively, Kw i ϕ is true at s if and only if ϕ has the same truth value on the worlds that i thinks possible. Knowing whether logic is not normal, because Kw i (ϕ → ψ) → (Kw i ϕ → Kw i ψ) is invalid (and, in relation to that, ϕ → ψ does not imply Kw i ϕ → Kw i ψ). In the countermodel M 1 below we have that M 1 , s Kw i (p → q) and M 1 , s Kw i p, but M 1 , s Kw i q. 
Expressivity and frame correspondence
In this section we compare the relative expressivity of knowing whether logic and epistemic logic, and we give some negative results for frame correspondence for knowing whether logic.
Expressivity
We adopt the definition of expressivity in [vDvdHK07, Def.8 
.2].
Definition 5 (Expressive). Given two logical languages L 1 and L 2 that are interpreted in the same class of models,
there is a formula ϕ 2 ∈ L 2 such that ϕ 1 ⇔ ϕ 2 (i.e., ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are logically equivalent).
• L 1 and
Proposition 6. PLKw is less expressive than EL on the class of K models, D-models, 4-models, 5-models.
Proof. This is a truth-preserving translation t from PLKw to EL:
Therefore EL is at least as expressive as PLKw. But PLKw is not at least as expressive as EL: even the simplest EL formula K i p does not have an equivalent PLKw correspondent. The pointed models (M, s) and (N , t) below, which are distinguished by K i p, cannot be distinguished by a PLKw formula.
Note that M and N are serial, transitive, and Euclidean. By induction we prove that M, s and N , t are modally equivalent in PLKw. The non-trivial case is ϕ = Kw i ψ. Note that s and t can only see one point. Therefore, M, s Kw i ψ and N , t Kw i ψ, so also, as required, M, s Kw i ψ iff N , t Kw i ψ.
Proposition 7. PLKw is less expressive than EL on the class of B-models.
Proof. Consider the following B-models (M ′ , s ′ ) and (N ′ , t ′ ). Again, they are distinguished by K i p, but are modally equivalent in PLKw (by a similar argument as in Prop. 6).
However, on the class of T -models, PLKw and EL are equally expressive.
Proposition 8. PLKw and EL are equally expressive on the class of T -models.
Proof. Consider translation t ′ : EL → PLKw:
This translation t ′ is truth preserving (elementary, by induction on ϕ in t ′ (ϕ)). This demonstrates that EL PLKw. As we already had PLKw EL, by way of translation t defined in the proof of Proposition 6, we get that EL ≡ PLKw on T .
This result applies to any model class contained in T , such as S4 and S5.
We close this section on expressivity with a curious observation related to (although not strictly about) expressivity. We now know that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of knowing whether on K, but that knowledge can be defined in terms of knowing whether on T . It is therefore interesting to observe that under slightly stronger conditions, knowledge can still be 'defined' (in a different technical sense) in terms of knowing whether on K, namely, given a model, in a world of that model wherein the agent is ignorant about something. Ignorant means 'not knowing whether', so this implies that knowledge is definable in a world from where there are at least two accessible worlds.
Proposition 9.
Assume that M, s ¬Kw i ψ for some ψ. Then: M, s K i ¬ϕ if and only if there exists a χ such that M,
Proof. Suppose that M, s ¬Kw i ψ for some ψ. We need to show the equivalence.
First, assume there exists χ: M, s Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i (ϕ → χ) ∧ ¬Kw i χ. Suppose towards contradiction that M, s K i ¬ϕ, then there exists t such that s → i t and t ϕ. Moreover, since M, s ¬Kw i χ, it follows for some t 1 , t 2 with s → i t 1 , s → i t 2 and t 1 χ, t 2 ¬χ. By the fact that s Kw i ϕ, s → i t, s → i t 1 and t ϕ, we get t 1 ϕ, similarly we can get t 2 ϕ, and thus t 1 ϕ → χ but t 2 ϕ → χ, contradicting the assumption that M, s Kw i (ϕ → χ), as desired.
For the converse, assume M, s K i ¬ϕ. Then for all t such that s → i t : M, t ¬ϕ, thus M, t ϕ → ψ. Therefore M, s Kw i ϕ and M, s Kw i (ϕ → ψ). It is clear M, s ¬Kw i ψ from the supposition. Then we can conclude that there exists χ: M, s Kw i ϕ∧Kw i (ϕ → χ)∧¬Kw i χ.
Intuitively, we can 'define' knowledge (the K i ¬ϕ in the proposition) in a given world s, iff there is some PLKw formula ψ that agent i is ignorant about in s (iff ¬Kw i ψ is true in s), in other words, iff for any proposition whatsoever (ψ) there are two accessible worlds from s with different values for it.
The property formulated in Prop. 9 is important. It motivates the canonical model construction for knowing whether logic, as we will see in Section 4.
Frame correspondence
Standard modal logic formulas can be used to capture frame properties, e.g., Kp → p corresponds to the reflexivity of frames. It is therefore remarkable that in knowing whether logic there is no such correspondence for most of the basic frame properties. The authors of [vdHL03] already demonstated that reflexivity is undefinable in the language of ignorance (which is equally expressive as PLKw, see Section 7). In this section we extend their result to other frame properties. Proposition 11. Let F be a partial-functional frame and ϕ ∈ PLKw. Then F |= Kw i ϕ.
Definition 10 (Frame definability
Proof. Given F = S, {→ i | i ∈ I} , let V be a valuation on F and s ∈ S. Because s has at most one successor, the semantics of knowing whether gives us that F, V, s |= Kw i ϕ. (See also the countermodels used in the proof of Prop. 6.) Consequently, we can view Kw i ϕ formulas as ⊤ on partial-functional frames. Therefore the only PLKw validities on partial-functional frames are essentially instantiations of tautologies which are the same on partial-functional models. A moment of reflection should confirm:
Corollary 12. For any partial-functional frames F, F ′ and any ϕ ∈ PLKw: F |= ϕ iff F ′ |= ϕ.
Proposition 13. The frame properties of seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and Euclidicity are not definable in PLKw.
Proof. Consider the following frames:
All two frames are partial-functional. So we have that, for any Φ ⊆ PLKw:
• F 2 is reflexive but F 1 is not reflexive.
• F 2 is serial but F 1 is not serial.
• F 2 is transitive but F 1 is not transitive.
• F 2 is symmetric but F 1 is not symmetric.
• F 2 is Euclidean but F 1 is not Euclidean.
The argument now goes as follows. Consider the first item, reflexivity: If Φ were to define reflexivity, then, as F 2 is reflexive, we have F 2 |= Φ. But as F 2 and F 1 satisfy the same frame validities, we also have that F 1 |= Φ. However, F 1 is not reflexive. Therefore such a Φ does not exist. Therefore, reflexivity is not frame definable in knowing whether logic.
The argument is similar for the other cases, using the other items in the list above. (Observe that F 1 is indeed not Euclidean, because s 1 → t and s 1 → t, but it is not the case that t → t.)
As a consequence of this result, the axiomatizations of knowing whether logics over special frame classes, such as the class of reflexive frames, cannot be shown by the standard method of adding the corresponding frame axioms to the axiomatization of PLKw. This will be addressed in Section 5.
Axiomatization
In this section we give a complete Hilbert-style proof system for the logic PLKw on the class of all frames.
Proof system and soundness
Definition 14 (Proof system PLKW). The proof system PLKW consists of the following axiom schemas and inference rules.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
A derivation is a finite sequence of PLKw formulas such that each formula is either the instantiation of an axiom or the result of applying a inference rule to prior formulas in the sequence. A formula ϕ ∈ PLKw is called derivable, or a theorem, notation ⊢ ϕ, if it occurs in a derivation.
Intuitively, KwCon means if an agent knows whether a formula is implied not only by some formula but by its negation, then the agent also knows whether the formula holds; KwDis means if an agent knows whether a formula holds, then either the agent knows this formula holds, in which case the agent knows whether its negation implies any formula, or the agent knows it does not hold, in which case the agent knows whether it implies any formula; Kw ↔ means knowing whether a formula holds is same as knowing whether the formula does not hold.
Proposition 15. The proof system PLKW is sound with respect to the class of all frames.
Proof. The soundness of PLKW follows immediately from the validity of three crucial axioms. The other axioms and the derivation rules are obviously valid. We prove that:
1. Assume towards a contradiction that for some
, s → i t 2 and t 1 ϕ, t 2 ¬ϕ. Clearly, with t 1 ϕ we get t 1 χ → ϕ and t 1 ¬χ → ϕ. Thus from the fact that s Kw i (χ → ϕ), s → i t 1 , s → i t 2 and t 1 χ → ϕ we get t 2 χ → ϕ. Similarly, by using t 1 ¬χ → ϕ we can get t 2 ¬χ → ϕ. Now we obtain t 2 χ → ϕ and t 2 ¬χ → ϕ, therefore t 2 ϕ. Contradiction.
Let (M, s) be an arbitrary model. Suppose via contraposition that
and, there exist u 1 , u 2 such that s → i u 1 , s → i u 2 and u 1 ¬ϕ → χ, u 2 ¬(¬ϕ → χ), respectively. From t 2 ¬(ϕ → ψ) and u 2 ¬(¬ϕ → χ) it follows t 2 ϕ and u 2 ¬ϕ respectively. So far we have shown s → i t 2 , s → i u 2 and t 2 ϕ, u 2 ¬ϕ, therefore we conclude that M, s ¬Kw i ϕ, as desired.
3. This is immediate from the semantics of Kw i .
Proposition 16. Consider the inference rule Substitution of equivalents:
Sub From ϕ ↔ ψ, infer χ[ϕ/p] ↔ χ[ψ/p]
Substitution of equivalents is admissible in PLKW.
Proof. By induction on the structure of χ. The non-trivial case is
The inference rule REKw in the system PLKW is crucial. Consider again the schema
We have already shown in Section 2 that K is invalid. This axiom is typically used to prove Sub, but is lacking in PLKW. Without REKw (see the proof above) Sub is not admissable in PLKW.
We will now first derive a PLKW theorem (Proposition 19) that will play an important part in the completeness proof. To structure the derivation we employ two lemmas deriving PLKW theorems.
Proof.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. The base step k = 1 is clear from Lemma 17. For the inductive step, assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the proposition holds for k = m. We now show that:
The proof is as follows.
Completeness
We proceed with the completeness of the proof system PLKW. The completeness of the logic is shown via a canonical model construction.
Definition 20 (Canonical model). The canonical model M c of PLKW is the tuple S c , {→ c i | i ∈ I}, V c , where:
• S c = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of PLKW}.
• s → c i t iff 1. there exists χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ s and 2. for all ϕ and ψ:
• V c (p) = {s ∈ S c | p ∈ s}.
We observe that every consistent set of PLKW can be extended to a maximal consistent set of PLKW (Lindenbaum Lemma) in the standard way. The binary relations between worlds in the canonical model are special. The definition is inspired by the canonical relation where s → c i t iff for all ϕ: K i ϕ ∈ s implies ϕ ∈ t, and the observation of Proposition 9, the 'almost definability' of knowledge. We also use the contrapositive this condition:
For every i ∈ I, s → c i t iff (1.) there exists χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ s and (2.) for all ϕ and ψ: if ϕ ∈ t then at least one of Kw i ϕ, Kw i (ϕ → ψ) and ¬Kw i ψ is not in s.
Lemma 21 (Truth Lemma). For any
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only non-trivial case is Kw i ϕ.
"⇐": Assume towards contradiction that Kw i ϕ ∈ s but M, s ¬Kw i ϕ, namely there are t 1 and t 2 such that s → c i t 1 and s → c i t 2 and M c , t 1 ϕ and M c , t 2 ¬ϕ. From M c , t 1 ϕ and M c , t 2 ¬ϕ, and the induction hypothesis, we infer that ϕ ∈ t 1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 , respectively. From s → c i t 1 and (1.) we infer that there is a χ 1 such that ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s. From that, the assumption Kw i ϕ ∈ s and (2.) follows that Kw i (ϕ → χ 1 ) ∈ s, i.e., ¬Kw i (ϕ → χ 1 ) ∈ s. Similarly, from s → c i t 2 we derive that there is a χ 2 such that ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → χ 2 ) ∈ s. From ¬Kw i (ϕ → χ 1 ), ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → χ 2 ) ∈ s and Axiom KwDis we now have ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ s. Contradiction.
"⇒": Assume that Kw i ϕ / ∈ s. To show that s Kw i ϕ, we need to construct two points t 1 , t 2 ∈ S c such that s → c i t 1 , s → c i t 2 and ϕ ∈ t 1 , ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 . First we have to show:
We prove item 1. Suppose the set is inconsistent. Then there exist χ 1 , · · · , χ n and ψ 1 , · · · , ψ n such that ⊢ ¬χ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬χ n → ϕ and
∈ s, from the maximal consistency of s we get ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ s. Then, from Proposition 19 we infer that n k=1 Kw i ψ k ∈ s. And this contradicts that ¬Kw i ψ k ∈ s for all k ∈ [1, n].
From item 1, the definition of the canonical relation, and the observation that every consistent set has a maximal consistent extension (Lindenbaum Lemma), we conclude that there exists a t 2 ∈ S c such that s → c i t 2 and ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 . The proof of item 2 is similar to item 1, but we need to use Kw ↔, and similarly, from item 2 we derive that there exists a t 1 ∈ S c such that s → c i t 1 and ϕ ∈ t 1 .
Theorem 22 (Completeness)
. PLKW is complete with respect to the class K of all frames. That is, for every ϕ ∈ PLKw, ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ, then ¬ϕ is PLKW-consistent. By Lindenbaum-Lemma there exists s ∈ S c such that ¬ϕ ∈ s, and thus M c , s ¬ϕ by Truth Lemma, therefore ϕ.
Given the translation from PLKw to EL (i.e. the translation t in the proof of Proposition 6), and the decidability of EL, the (satisfiability problem of) knowing whether logic is obviously decidable.
Proposition 23 (Decidability of PLKw). The logic PLKw is decidable.
Axiomatization: extensions
In this section we will give extensions of PLKW w.r.t. various classes of frames, and prove their completeness. Definition 24 shows the extra axiom schemas and corresponding systems, with on the right-hand side in the table the frame classes for which we will demonstrate completeness.
Definition 24 (Extensions of PLKW).
Notation Axiom Schemas Systems Frames
Proposition 25.
• KwT is valid on the class of all T -frames;
• Kw4 is valid on the class of all 4-frames;
• Kw5 is valid on the class of all 5-frames.
• Given any M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V based on a reflexive frame and an s ∈ S, suppose M,
Towards a contradiction assume M, s Kw i ψ, then there exist t, t ′ such that s → i t, s → i t ′ and t ψ, t ′ ¬ψ. From the reflexivity of s it follows that s → i s, and thus t ϕ, t ′ ϕ by the facts that s Kw i ϕ ∧ ϕ, s → i t, s → i t ′ . Then it is easy to get t ϕ → ψ but t ′ ϕ → ψ, which contradicts the supposition s Kw i (ϕ → ψ).
• Given any M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V based on a transitive frame and an s ∈ S, suppose that M, s Kw i ϕ. Towards a contradiction assume M, s Kw i (Kw i ϕ ∨ ψ) for some ψ, then there exist t, t ′ such that s → i t, s → i t ′ and t Kw i ϕ ∨ ψ, t ′ ¬Kw i ϕ ∧ ¬ψ. From t ′ ¬Kw i ϕ it follows that for some u, u ′ such that t ′ → i u, t ′ → i u ′ and u ϕ, u ′ ¬ϕ. From transitivity it follows that s → i u, s → i u ′ due to the facts that s → i t ′ , t ′ → i u and t ′ → i u ′ . Therefore s Kw i ϕ, contradicting the assumption.
• Given any M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V based on an Euclidean frame and an s ∈ S, suppose that M, s ¬Kw i ϕ. Towards a contradiction assume M, s Kw i (¬Kw i ϕ ∨ ψ). Then there exist t, t ′ such that s → i t, s → i t ′ and t ¬Kw i ϕ ∨ ψ, t ′ Kw i ϕ ∧ ¬ψ. Moreover, it follows that for some u, u ′ such that s → i u, s → i u ′ and u ϕ, u ′ ¬ϕ from the supposition. Since M is Euclidean, t ′ → i u and t ′ → i u ′ based on the facts that s
To prove the soundness of the novel proof systems we only need to refer to the soundness of the axioms KwT, Kw4, and Kw5, as demonstrated in Proposition 25. Before we proceed to demonstrate the completeness of these systems, let us first give some intuitions and motivation to explain the form of the axioms. The reader might have expected a more familiar connection between frame classes and axioms instead:
• For reflexive frames: why not
• For transitive frames: why not
• For Euclidean frames: why not
First, we recall the reader that none of these frame classes are definable by knowing whether formulas (Prop. 13). So, the axioms in the proof systems defined above fulfil a different role, there is no correspondence in the standard modal logical sense. Second, the three 'familiar' formula schemas tentatively stipulated above could of course still be valid. But are they? Sometimes yes, at other times no. Concerning Kw i ϕ → ϕ: this is of course not valid in knowing whether logic (you may know whether p because you know that p is false). Further, trying to obtain an interesting validity by translating axiom K i ϕ → ϕ from epistemic logic into PLKw (according to the translation defined in Prop. 8) does not lead anywhere: we get ϕ∧Kw i ϕ → ϕ, a tautology. Concerning Kw i ϕ → Kw i Kw i ϕ: this is valid on transitive frames. It is also derivable in the proof system PLKW4 defined above: it is essentially an instantiation of axiom Kw4 for ψ = ⊥. 2 But just this principle wKw4 on top of PLKW was not enough to obtain completeness (Prop. 27 below), we do need the stronger version Kw4. However, in the presence of KwT, wKw4 is sufficient to demonstrate completeness for PLKWS4 (Prop. 35), since we can actually derive Kw4 in the system based on wKw4 and KwT (Prop. 26). A similar story goes for wKw5 and Kw5: PLKW+wKw5 is not complete w.r.t. Euclidean frames but PLKWS5 = PLKW + KwT + wKw5 is complete w.r.t. S5-frames (Prop. 28 and Prop. 36).
The following proposition says that Kw4 and Kw5 are derivable in PLKWS4 and PLKWS5 respectively, which are crucial in the proofs of Theorem 35 and Theorem 36, respectively.
The following is a derivation in PLKWS4:
2. Similar to 1, by using Axiom wKw5.
Before the completeness results, we first show two negative results which demonstrate that only adding wKw4 (resp. wKw5) on top of PLKW is not enough for completeness of PLKw over transitive (resp. Euclidean) frames.
Proposition 27. PLKW + wKw4 is incomplete with respect to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. Recall that Kw
is an instance of Kw4 and it is valid on the class of all transitive frames (Prop.25). We will show that this formula is not a theorem of PLKW + wKw4. For this, we construct a model M such that PLKW + wKw4 is sound with respect to validity on M (i.e. for any PLKw formula ϕ,
is not provable in PLKW + wKw4 but it is valid over transitive frames, PLKW + wKw4 is not complete w.r.t. the class of all transitive frames. Consider the following model M (w.l.o.g. let us assume P = {p, q}):
u 2 : ¬p, ¬q s : p, q W W t t t t t t t t t t e e ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ t 2 : ¬p, ¬q First, remember that all the axioms of PLKW are valid on the class of all frames (Prop.15), thus they are also valid on M. As for the inference rules, their validities on M do not follow immediately from the fact that these rules are valid on the class of all frames. However, it is not hard to check that MP, NECKw and REKw are indeed valid on M, i.e., if the premise is valid on M then the conclusion is also valid on M.
Second, wKw4 is valid on M: by the construction of M, it is not hard to show by induction on the structure of ϕ ∈ PLKw that: for any ϕ, t 1 ϕ iff u 1 ϕ, and t 2 ϕ iff u 2 ϕ ( * ). As none of worlds t 1 , t 2 , u 1 , u 2 has any successor, then all of them satisfy Kw i Kw i ϕ, thus also satisfy wKw4 (Kw i ϕ → Kw i Kw i ϕ). Also, since t 1 and t 2 both satisfy Kw i ϕ for any ϕ, t Kw i Kw i ϕ for any ϕ too, and thus t Kw i ϕ → Kw i Kw i ϕ. Similarly, we can show that u Kw i ϕ → Kw i Kw i ϕ for any ϕ. Now from ( * ) we can see t Kw i ϕ iff u Kw i ϕ, which implies s Kw i Kw i ϕ, and thus s Kw i ϕ → Kw i Kw i ϕ. In sum, wKw4 is valid on M.
Finally, it is clear that M,
Proposition 28. PLKW + wKw5 is incomplete with respect to the class of Euclidean frames.
Proof. The strategy is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 27. Recall that the formula ¬Kw i p → Kw i (¬Kw i p ∨ q) is valid on the class of all Euclidean frames (Prop. 25). We only need to show that this formula is not a theorem of PLKW + wKw5. For this, we construct a model N such that PLKW + wKw5 is sound with respect to N (i.e., all the theorems of PLKW + wKw5 are valid on N ), but N ¬Kw i p → Kw i (¬Kw i p ∨ q).
Consider the following model N (again, let us assume P = {p, q}):
As in the previous proof, the axioms and inference rules of PLKW are valid on N . Now we show wKw5 is valid on N : by the construction of N , neither t nor u has successor, then they both satisfy Kw i ¬Kw i ϕ, and thus satisfy wKw5 (¬Kw i ϕ → Kw i ¬Kw i ϕ). Also, t Kw i ϕ and u Kw i ϕ, then s Kw i ¬Kw i ϕ, and thus
We now continue with the completeness proofs for the extended proof systems. We first address the completeness of PLKWT. In the canonical model construction of Def. 20 it is unclear whether the canonical relation is reflexive. To ensure that the relations are reflexive, we take the reflexive closure of the canonical relation. As before, we use an equivalent definition of the canonical relation: s → c i t iff s = t or (there exists a χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ s, and for all ϕ and ψ: ϕ ∈ t implies that at least one of Kw i ϕ, Kw i (ϕ → ψ) and ¬Kw i ψ is not in s).
Lemma 30 (Truth Lemma for PLKWT). For any
Proof. By induction on ϕ. We consider the non-trivial case for Kw i ϕ.
Left-to-right: This is similar to the corresponding proof in Lemma 21. Observe that all pairs in the canonical relation in Def. 20 are also in the relation → c i from Def. 29. Right-to-left: Assume towards contradiction that Kw i ϕ ∈ s but M c , s ¬Kw i ϕ, namely there are distinct states t 1 and t 2 such that s → c i t 1 and s → c i t 2 and M, t 1 ϕ and M, t 2 ¬ϕ. By induction hypothesis, ϕ ∈ t 1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 . As → c i is reflexive, we need to consider two cases (s = t 1 and s = t 2 is impossible, because t 1 = t 2 ):
• s = t 1 and s = t 2 .
Then the proof is same as the corresponding one in Lemma 21. And finally we can get a contradiction.
• s = t 1 or s = t 2 . We may as well consider the case s = t 1 and s = t 2 . Since ¬ϕ ∈ t 2 , Kw i ϕ ∈ s, and s → c i t 2 , by the equivalent definition of → c , there exists χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ s and ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s. By ϕ ∈ s and Kw i ϕ ∈ s and Axiom KwT, we get Kw i (ϕ → χ) → Kw i χ ∈ s. Since ¬Kw i χ ∈ s, ¬Kw i (ϕ → χ) ∈ s. Now ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s and ¬Kw i (ϕ → χ) ∈ s, thus by Axiom KwDis we conclude that ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ s. Contradiction.
Based on the above lemma, it is routine to show the following.
Theorem 31. PLKWT is complete with respect to the class of all T -frames.
Now let us look at the completeness for PLKW4 and PLKW5. In these cases we do not need to revise the canonical relations.
Theorem 32. PLKW4 is complete with respect to the class of all 4-frames.
Proof. Define M c as in Def. 20 w.r.t. PLKW4. We only need to show that → c i is transitive. Given s, t, u ∈ S c . Assume that s → c i t and t → c i u. From s → c i t it follows that there exist χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ s. To show s → c i u, by the definition of the canonical relation, we need to prove that for all ϕ and ψ: Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kw i ψ ∈ s implies ¬ϕ ∈ u. From now on, let us fix two formulas ϕ and ψ such that Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kw i ψ ∈ s. We need to show ¬ϕ ∈ u. From t → c i u it follows that there is a χ ′ such that ¬Kw i χ ′ ∈ t. Now according to the definition of → c i again, if we can show that Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i (ϕ → χ ′ ) ∈ t, then by t → c i u, we have ¬ϕ ∈ u. We first show that Kw i ϕ ∈ t: As Kw i ϕ ∈ s, first, by wKw4 and Kw ↔ we get Kw i ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ s; second, by Axiom Kw4 we get Kw i (Kw i ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s, i.e. Kw i (¬Kw i ϕ → ψ) ∈ s. Now we obtain Kw i ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ s, Kw i (¬Kw i ϕ → ψ) ∈ s, and ¬Kw i ψ ∈ s. By s → c i t we have Kw i ϕ ∈ t. We now show that
Theorem 33. PLKW5 is complete with respect to the class of all 5-frames.
Proof. Define M c as in Def. 20 w.r.t. PLKW5. We only need to show that → c i is Euclidean. Let s, t, u ∈ S c be given, and assume s → c i t and s → c i u. We then need to show that t → c i u, that is to say:
• There exists a χ such that ¬Kw i χ ∈ t ( †)
• For all ϕ and ψ:
( †): from the assumption s → c i t it follows that there exists χ 1 such that ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s. In the following we prove ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ t. Using s → c i t again, if we can show Kw i Kw i χ 1 ∧ Kw i (Kw i χ 1 → χ 1 ) ∧ ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s then we are done. By ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s, wKw5 and Kw ↔, we have Kw i Kw i χ 1 ∈ s. Using ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s again and ⊢ ¬Kw i χ 1 → Kw i (¬Kw i χ 1 ∨ χ 1 ) (an instance of Axiom Kw5), we get Kw i (¬Kw i χ 1 ∨ χ 1 ) ∈ s, and thus Kw i (Kw i χ 1 → χ 1 ) ∈ s from TAUT and REKw. Hence Kw i Kw i χ 1 ∧ Kw i (Kw i χ 1 → χ 1 ) ∧ ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ s, and therefore ¬Kw i χ 1 ∈ t by s → c i t.
( ‡): Now fixing two formulas ϕ, ψ such that Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kw i ψ ∈ t, we need to show ¬ϕ ∈ u. By the similar strategy as in the proof of Thm. 32, if we can prove Kw i ϕ∧Kw i (ϕ →
Moreover, by supposition Kw i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kw i ψ ∈ t and Axiom KwCon we derive ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ t. Then from ¬Kw i (ϕ → χ 1 ) ∧ ¬Kw i (¬ϕ → ψ) ∈ t and Axiom KwDis it follows that ¬Kw i ϕ ∈ t, contradiction.
Corollary 34. PLKW45 is complete with respect to the class of all 45-frames.
Proof. This follows directly from Thm. 32 and Thm. 33. The canonical model w.r.t. PLKW45 is both transitive and Euclidean.
Theorem 35. PLKWS4 is complete with respect to the class of all S4-frames.
Proof. Define M c as Def. 29 w.r.t. PLKWS4. Given Thm. 31, we only need to show that → c i is transitive. Now given s, t, u ∈ S c , and assume s → c i t and t → c i u, we need to show s → c i u. If s = t or t = u or s = u, then by the assumption and the fact that → c i is reflexive, we get s → c i u. Thus we consider the case s = t, t = u and s = u. The proof for this case is the same as Thm. 32, as we can use Kw4 due to Prop. 26.
Theorem 36. PLKWS5 is complete with respect to the class of all S5-frames.
Proof. Define M c as Def. 29 w.r.t. PLKWS5. Given Thm. 31, we only need to show that → c i is Euclidean. Now given s, t, u ∈ S c , and assume s → c i t and s → c i u, we need to show t → c i u. If s = t, t = u and s = u, then the proof is the same as in Thm. 33, as we can use Kw5 due to Prop. 26. If s = t or t = u, then by the assumption and the fact that → c i is reflexive, we get t → c i u. If s = u and t = u, we need to show t → c i u. This can be proved by using Axiom KwT instead of the assumption that s → c i u in the corresponding proof of Thm. 33.
Knowing whether logic with announcements
In the muddy children puzzle, children learn their status by repeating the announcement "nobody knows whether he or she is muddy." In this section we add public announcement modalities to knowing whether logic. We will first give the language and its semantics, and then propose an axiomatization that can be shown to be complete because all formulas with announcements are provably equivalent to formulas without announcement (the proof system defines a rewrite procedure). 
This is the reason that the proof system below must contain formula variables (schematic formulas) instead of propositional variables, and also for that reason we have presented the proof system PLKW in the same way.
Definition 39 (Proof system PLKWA). The proof system PLKWA is the extension of PLKW (Def. 14) with the following reduction axioms for announcements.
Proposition 40 (Soundness). PLKWA is sound with respect to the class of all frames.
Proof. We only consider the non-trivial axiom schema !Kw. Left-to-right: Given any model M = S, {→ i | i ∈ I}, V based on a frame and s ∈ S, assume that M, s [ϕ]Kw i ψ. We now need to show that M, The logic PLKwA is equally expressive as knowing whether logic, as the axiomatization induces a rewrite procedure. By defining a suitable complexity, we can rewrite every formula in PLKwA as a logically equivalent formula of PLKw of lower complexity, and thus the completeness for PLKWA follows from the completenes of PLKW (see [vDvdHK07, WC13] for this reduction technique).
Theorem 41 (Completeness of PLKWA). For every ϕ ∈ PLKwA, ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
As axiomatization PLKWA gives a translation of PLKwA into PLKw, and PLKw is decidable (Prop. 23), the logic of knowing whether with announcements is also decidable.
Proposition 42. PLKwA is decidable.
We can also consider the logic of knowing whether with announcement on other frame classes, where our main interest is the class of S5 frames. The expressivity of knowing whether logics for other frame classes also does not change by adding the announcement operator, as the reduction axioms and rules still allow every formula to be rewritten to an equivalent expression without announcements (so, a fortiori, this also holds for theorems of those logics).
Theorem 43. Consider the proof system PLKWAS5 that extends PLKWA with KwT and wKw5. PLKWAS5 is complete with respect to the class of S5-frames.
Comparison with the literature
In [vdHL03, vdHL04] , the authors give a complete axiomatization of a logic of ignorance with primitive modal construct Iϕ, for 'the agent is ignorant about ϕ'. If an agent is ignorant about ϕ, she does not know whether ϕ, so Iϕ is definable as ¬Kwϕ. Their axiomatization Ig is shown in Def. 44, wherein we have replaced I by ¬Kw. It is different from ours. Now it is of course a matter of taste whether one prefers the system PLKW over PLKw (page 7) or the one below, but we tend to find ours simpler, e.g. with respect to the axioms I3 and I4 below.
Definition 44 (Axiomatization Ig [vdHL03, vdHL04] ).
I0
All instances of propositional tautologies
I1 ¬Kw i ϕ ↔ ¬Kw i ¬ϕ I2 ¬Kw i (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ¬Kw i ϕ ∨ ¬Kw i ψ I3 (Kw i ϕ ∧ ¬Kw i (χ 1 ∧ ϕ) ∧ Kw i (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬Kw i (χ 2 ∧ (ϕ → ψ))) → Kw i ψ ∧ ¬Kw i (χ 1 ∧ ψ) I4 Kw i ψ ∧ ¬Kw i χ → ¬Kw i (χ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬Kw i (χ ∧ ¬ψ) RI From ϕ infer Kw i ϕ ∧ (¬Kw i χ → ¬Kw i (χ ∧ ϕ)) MP
Modus Ponens Sub Substitution of equivalents
Since both systems are complete, their axioms and inference rules are derivable in our system PLKW, and we show precisely how to do it: i.e., we will derive in PLKW axioms I2, I3, and I4, and the rules RI and Sub. This lengthy exercise is reported in Appendix A. PLKW can also be derived from Ig due to the completeness of Ig. The proof system Ig is also extended with an axiom G4, which we present in terms of Kw:
It is then claimed that Ig + G4 is a complete axiomatization of the logic of ignorance over transitive frames [vdHL04, Lemma 4 .2]. Unfortunately, we think that G4 is invalid, thus the system is not sound. Consider this countermodel M
and the formula
Observe s ¬Kw i p and s Kw i q ∧ ¬Kw i (q ∧ p). Then, note that s Kw i (Kw i q ∧ ¬Kw i (p ∧ q)) (take u and t as two witnesses), thus
Therefore, this formula is false in state s of this model M, which invalidates G4. 3 In this paper, we advanced the research beyond [vdHL04] by proving expressivity results and more undefinability results. And more importantly, apart from correctly axiomatizing knowing whether logic over transitive frames (the system PLKW4), we also axiomatized PLKw on various other frame classes, which was considered hard in [vdHL04] . Further, we extended knowing whether logic with public announcements, and gave a complete axiomatization for that extension.
Another recent work on a logic of ignorance is [Ste08] . The author gives a topological semantics for the logic of ignorance and completely axiomatizes it by the following proof system LB (we have replaced in [Ste08] by Kw):
Definition 46 (Axiomatization LB).
TAUT All instances of propositional tautologies
N Kw i ⊤ ↔ ⊤ Z Kw i ϕ ↔ Kw i ¬ϕ R Kw i ϕ ∧ Kw i ψ → Kw i (ϕ ∧ ψ) WM From Kw i ϕ ∧ ϕ → ψ infer Kw i ϕ ∧ ϕ → Kw i ψ ∧ ψ MP
Modus Ponens Sub
Substitution of equivalents
This proof system is equivalent to our system PLKWS4 for PLKw over S4-frames in the following sense. Appendix B contains the proof. Unlike Proposition 45, Proposition 47 cannot be obtained using the completeness of both systems, since the semantics of the two logics are different. Compared to PLKWS4, the axioms of LB are simpler, while the rules are more complicated (WM is clearly a complex derivation rule, and in PLKWS4 the rule Sub is admissable instead). It is again a matter of taste which system is preferable. Nevertheless, the above result also shows that the topological semantics in [Ste08] is equivalent to our Kripke semantics over S4-frames, modulo validity.
Conclusions and further research
We first summarize our contributions.
• We gave complete axiomatizations of PLKw over the frame classes K, T , 4, 5, 45, S4, and S5.
• PLKw cannot define the frame classes D, T , B, 4, and 5.
• PLKw is less expressive than EL over model classes K, D, B, 4, and 5. It is equally expressive as EL over T (and classes contained in T , such as S4 and S5).
• We axiomatized the logic of knowing whether with public announcements, PLKwA, and demonstrated that it is equally expressive as PLKw.
• The axiomatization PLKW for knowing whether logic is equivalent to Ig of [vdHL03] , and the axiomatization PLKWS4 for knowing whether logic over transitive frames is equivalent to LB of [Ste08] .
We continue with ideas on further research.
• To complete the axiomatization spectrum, we want to axiomatize PLKw over D-and B-frames. We expect similar techniques as in the case of PLKWT to work, while finding the right axioms may be hard.
• As said, knowing whether seems a natural modality and able to express statements succinctly. To make this intuition concrete, we conjecture that PLKw over reflexive models is exponentially more succinct than EL if there are at least two agents. The computational complexity of knowing whether logics is also left for future work.
• The comparison with [Ste08] demonstrates that the same logic may be obtained by different semantics based on different models. The undefinability of frame properties suggests that the Kripke semantics may not be the best semantics for knowing whether logic. We intend to investigate neighbourhood semantics and other weaker semantics for PLKw.
• We consider adding group operators for knowing whether (or ignorance) to the language. There are various options to define such group operators. Is a group G ignorant of ϕ if, when defining the accessibility relation for G as the transitive closure of the union of all relations, both a state where ϕ is true and a state where ϕ is false are group-accessible? Or should all agents consider states possible where ϕ is true and where ϕ is false, and then we 'simply' take Kleene-iteration of that? There are yet other ways to define group ignorance, and the notion of group ignorance is under close scrutiny in formal epistemology [Han11, Hen10] .
• We consider adding arbitrary announcement operators [BBvD + 08] to knowing whether logic. One can then express, for example, that after any announcement agent i remains ignorant: ¬Kw i ϕ. This addition becomes more challenging if one then removes the announcement operators from the logical language and defines the arbitrary announcement by modally definable model restrictions.
